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Reflections on the Death Penalty: 
Human Rights, Human Dignity, and 
Dehumanization in the Death House 
Robert Johnson* 
ABSTRACT  
A working definition of human dignity is developed and applied to the 
death penalty. It is argued that the death penalty is inherently 
dehumanizing and hence is a violation of human dignity. 
KEYWORDS  
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Meals, Last Words, Executions, Capital Punishment 
 
A central premise of human rights thinking is that each and every human 
being has an innate dignity that must be respected. Respect for one’s 
human dignity is the original human right from which other human rights 
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flow.1 This begs two closely related questions: “What does it mean to be a 
human being?” and “What does it mean to respect a person’s human 
dignity?” In sketching an answer to these questions, I will offer what might 
be called a working definition of human nature and the human dignity 
possessed by all human beings by virtue of their status as human beings. 
Using this working definition, I will argue that the death penalty is 
inherently dehumanizing and hence is a violation of human dignity and 
human rights. 
HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
At its core, the answer to the question, “What does it mean to be a 
human being?” starts with the matter of consciousness. Human beings are 
endowed with the capacity for a conscious awareness of self that marks 
the individual as distinct and separate from others; that conscious 
awareness is found in a world that exists independently of individuals 
and can be understood objectively through the use of reason.2 
Individual distinctiveness is understood through the use of the unique 
human capacity to reason about the world and one’s place in the world, 
which in turn entails the capacity, and ultimately the obligation, to bear 
responsibility for one’s life as a continuing moral enterprise.3 Reasoning 
thus makes it possible to understand oneself as having a life that can be 
                                                                                                                           
1 See generally ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE 
WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2012). 
2 See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN 
THE REAL WORLD 40–45 (1999). 
3 ERNST CASSIRER, ESSAY ON A MAN 1–6 (l970); see generally Herbert Morris, 
Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31 (l976). Cassirer distills the essential 
wisdom of Socrates on the subject of human nature as follows: “‘A life which is 
unexamined,’ says Socrates in his Apology, ‘is not worth living.’ We may epitomize the 
thought of Socrates by saying that man is defined by him as that being who, when asked 
a rational question, can give a rational answer. Both his knowledge and his morality are 
comprehended in this circle.  It is by this fundamental faculty, by this faculty of giving a 
response to himself and to others, that man becomes a ‘responsible’ being, a moral 
subject.” CASSIRER at 6. 
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reflected upon and understood to be one’s own, for which one is 
responsible; and, further, to understand that this awareness and its 
consequences—that is, individual consciousness, identity, and moral 
obligation—are necessarily true for other human beings as well.4 
Awareness that one has a life that can be understood to be one’s own 
conveys the capacity to make choices that shape the course of one’s life, 
which is to say, choices that permit self-determination.5 Self–determination 
is necessarily achieved in the world of other human beings through a 
process of self-defining social interactions.6 No human being is born in 
isolation from others or lives in isolation without the implicit permission of 
others. We are born into a society composed of others who, like ourselves, 
possess the capacity for autonomous thought and action, and who must be 
seen and treated as intrinsically equal in kind and value to us because they 
are fellow human beings.7 
Human beings shape their distinctive characters through self-
determining choices and actions. We are self-directed, in that choice and 
action come from within. We are also connected to others outside 
ourselves, those who comprise the social context against which 
individuality is situated and in which choices and actions are grounded.8 
No human being, to paraphrase the great metaphysical poet John Donne, is 
                                                                                                                           
4 SEARLE, supra note 2, at 42; see generally LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A HISTORY (2007); see generally SUSIE LINFIELD, THE CRUEL RADIANCE: 
PHOTOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 46 (2010) (discussing “our growing 
consciousness of what it means to be human” from the perspective of photography). 
5 See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 
39 n. 10 (1976); see generally Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 
AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 265 (l981); see generally Morris, supra note 3. 
6 JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 9 (l922); ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, 
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 21 (3d ed. 1954); see generally PAUL BLOOM, JUST 
BABIES: THE ORIGINS OF GOOD AND EVIL (2013). 
7 See DALY, supra note 1; see generally HUNT, supra note 4; LINFIELD, supra note 4. 
8 DEWEY, supra note 6, at 9; see generally LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CONDITION OF 
MAN (1944). 
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an island secure unto him- or herself.9 We are separate yet part of the 
whole, always working out our lives in relation to the possibilities 
embodied in the social world, the world formed by the decisions and 
actions of ourselves and others.10 
The answer to the second question, “What does it mean to respect a 
person’s human dignity?” comes down to acknowledging their humanity, a 
humanity shared by all human beings by virtue of being human beings. 
Awareness of self, reason, choice, connection to others—these are part and 
parcel of what it means to be a member of the human species.11 These 
attributes, in turn, convey the moral right to live as a human being, which 
is to say, to act on one’s awareness of self, to use reason, to make choices, 
and to take into account the existence and corresponding rights of other 
human beings. The essential respect due another human being is to treat 
him or her as a human being with the right to live as a human being. To be 
sure, the capabilities that undergird our humanity vary over the life course 
and among individual persons—in awareness of self, in reasoning power, 
in insight, in the capacity to see others as like oneself and, indeed, in the 
ability to see oneself in others, often captured in the notion of empathy. 
These capabilities vary as a function of genetic, congenital, developmental, 
or environmental factors. Yet even with such variations, all human 
                                                                                                                           
9 JOHN DONNE, No Man is an Island, in MEDITATION XVII: DEVOTIONS UPON 
EMERGENT OCCASIONS (1864). 
10 ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING THE PRISON 93–
94 (2002). Brian Hare, From Nonhuman to Human Mind; What Changed and Why?, 16 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 60, 60–61 (2007) (Arguing that human beings 
are endowed with a “unique flexibility of behavior . . . As humans, we are skilled at 
assessing the perceptions, intentions, and beliefs of others” and adjusting our behavior 
accordingly. “The ability to use social cues in a cooperative-communicative context . . .  
seems to have evolved after the hominid split” and thus is, as far as science can tell us at 
this time, distinctly human and central to our understanding of human social behavior.). 
11 BLOOM, supra note 6, at 218. We are, even as babies, “moral animals, equipped by 
evolution with empathy and compassion, the capacity to judge the actions of others, and 
even some rudimentary understanding of justice and fairness.” Our identity as fully 
developed human beings “is the product of our compassion, our imagination, and our 
magnificent capacity for reason.” Id. 
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creatures share an essential humanity and, by virtue of that endowment, 
possess human dignity and hence the right to be treated like human beings. 
CRIME AND CHOICE: CHOOSING CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS 
In the area of crime and punishment, we stipulate that the vast majority 
of human beings are responsible for their criminal choices, even if there 
are factors in their lives—such as abuse, neglect, or discrimination—which 
limit action or cause damage that in turn mitigates or reduces that 
responsibility.12 Criminal choices result in actions that typically, perhaps 
necessarily, violate the human dignity of the victims, who are treated like 
objects or animals, not fellow human beings. But when we punish 
criminals, we explicitly seek not to replicate the essential criminal quality 
of the crimes in question; we seek not to dehumanize, but rather to hold 
accountable the human beings who committed the crimes and who, 
moreover, deserves to be held accountable for criminal actions they chose 
to commit.13 
Punishment that dehumanizes is itself a crime; punishment that respects 
the human dignity of the criminal is justice. In the matter of crime and just 
punishment, criminals dehumanize their victims but, ideally, the 
punishments meted out in society’s name do not dehumanize the criminals. 
Punishment is meant to entail sanctions that reflect a moral point of view.14 
The person punished should deserve that punishment and, according to 
Plato’s Laws, should emerge from that punishment “a better man, or failing 
this, less of a wretch.”15 In a similar vein, in his Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle famously claimed that “punishment is intended as moral 
                                                                                                                           
12 See generally Craig W. Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the 
Nature and Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (2008). 
13 Morris, supra note 5, at 265. 
14 Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
208, 208–09 (1984); Morris, supra note 5, at 25. 
15 Plato, Laws, Book IX, in PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 854 (d)–(e) (R. G. Bury trans., 
1967). 
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medicine.”16 Ideally, any given punishment should offer a moral lesson 
because it is deserved and, hence, right and just. The point of a moral 
exchange is to offer the possibility for change and even redemption to the 
wayward offender now in our custody and also our care. Punishment hurts, 
but punishment should not demean, damage, or extinguish hope by 
precluding change.17 
Regrettably, criminal sanctions in the real world too often are criminal 
themselves, trafficking in widespread and pervasive dehumanization and 
producing a host of harms, some permanent and beyond amelioration.18 To 
impose sanctions that damage and dehumanize is antithetical to basic 
human rights; such sanctions deny and suppress a person’s humanity and 
hence violate one’s inherent human dignity. It is critical to note that, as a 
general matter, and in sharp contrast to practices in Western Europe, 
“American criminal justice displays a resistance to considering the very 
personhood of offenders”19 and a blindness to routine acts of cruelty.20 
Nowhere is the routine violation of the offenders’ personhood or 
humanity more evident than in America’s prisons—and especially 
America’s high-security and supermax prisons21—grim settings to which 
long-term inmates are routinely relegated.22 
                                                                                                                           
16 Aristotle, Punishment in Intended as a Moral Medicine, in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
33 (D. Ross & L. Brown trans., 2009). 
17 ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 
233 (2d. ed., 1998); see generally HANS TOCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1986). 
18 JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 6–9; see also TODD R. CLEAR, HARM IN AMERICAN 
PENOLOGY: OFFENDERS, VICTIMS, AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 4–5 (1994) (thoughtfully 
discussing harms without explicit consideration of whether those harms entail 
permanent damage). 
19 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 9 (2003) 
20 ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 12–13 
(2014). 
21 Craig W. Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Prison 
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 125 (2003); Haney, supra note 12, at 956. 
22 For examples of this phenomenon, see generally DWAYNE BETTS, A QUESTION OF 
FREEDOM: A MEMOIR OF LEARNING, SURVIVAL, AND COMING OF AGE IN PRISON 
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DEATH ROW AND THE CRUCIBLE OF DEHUMANIZATION 
Among America’s high security prisons, the setting that is the most 
profoundly dehumanizing is death row. Condemned prisoners are 
warehoused for execution on death row in what amounts to solitary 
confinement.23 American states with high rates of executions, such as 
Texas, have the most repressive regimes of solitary confinement on their 
death rows.24 Research on the experience of death row confinement reveals 
widespread demoralization in the face of objectively dehumanizing 
conditions. That demoralization, in turn, is the end result of conditions of 
death row confinement that render prisoners powerless, vulnerable, and 
alone, deprived of opportunities to make decisions that affect the course of 
their lives in any meaningful way. In the words of the prisoners, the 
condemned are “the living dead”; death row, in turn, is a “living death.”25 
To put the matter another way, prisoners on death row are relegated to a 
kind of existential limbo, existing as entities in cold storage rather than 
living as human beings with even a modicum of self-determination.26 Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
(2010); VICTOR HASSINE, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING AND DYING IN PRISON 
TODAY (2010). 
23 See generally ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE 
OF DEATH 43–63 (1981); Robert Johnson & Harmony Davies, Life Under Sentence 
of Death: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT 
WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 661–86 (3d ed., 2014); Dave Mann, Solitary Men, 
OBSERVER (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:01 PM), http://www.texasobserver.org/solitary-men/.  
24 Johnson & Davies, supra note 23, at 668; Mann, supra note 23.  
25 JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 99–118; see generally JOHSNON, supra note 17, at 93; 
see also MARIO HECTOR, DEATH ROW: JAMAICAN PRISON DIARY (1984) (discussing 
death rows as unremittingly bleak living environments); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living 
Dead: Living on Death Row, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 183 (1989); LISA GUENTHER, 
SOCIAL DEATH AND ITS AFTERLIVES: A CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT (2013); Diana Peel, Clutching at Life, Waiting to Die: The Experience of 
Death Row Incarceration, 14 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 61 (2013). 
26 It is darkly ironic that for some condemned prisoners, called “execution volunteers,” 
the decision to drop their appeals rather than endure continued confinement on death 
row is the most autonomous action available to them. For a revealing case study of one 
such execution volunteer, see Robert Johnson, et al., Autonomy in Extremis: An 
Intelligent Waiver of Appeals on Death Row, 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 787 (2014). 
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for years, and more often decades, condemned prisoners are contained and 
constrained in solitary cells on death row, knowing that one day they will 
likely be moved to another cell, this one in the death house, and then 
finally to the death chamber, the last cell in the modern execution 
sequence. The death penalty as a penal sanction, though waning in 
popularity and declining in practice,27 is nevertheless here to stay, at least 
in the important sense that this penalty has repeatedly passed constitutional 
muster in relation to most offenders convicted of aggravated capital 
murder.28 The prisoners thus convicted, waning and declining in their 
circumscribed lives on death row, are in jeopardy. The threat of execution 
for them is quite real. At the end of this grim legal procession—from court 
to prison to death chamber—the condemned are, we know from 
ethnographic research on male prisoners, “defeated men, men worn down 
by time and pressure and isolation on death row.”29 
The condemned, male and female alike, are well-versed in a dark 
etiquette of submission. They are, to quote execution team officers from 
ethnographic research on the modern execution process, “humbled” by 
force of impending death, making up a class of the “walking dead.”30 
                                                                                                                           
27 William J. Bowers & Scott E. Sundby, Why the Downturn in Death Sentences?, in THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 47–67 (Charles S. Lanier, William J. Bowers, & 
James R. Acker eds., 2009). 
28  Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment 
Law, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 77–100 (James R. 
Acker, Robert M. Bohm, & Charles S. Lanier eds.,  2014); John D. Bessler, Capital 
Punishment Law and Practices: History, Trends, and Developments, in AMERICA'S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 19–37, 32 (James R. Acker, Robert M. 
Bohm, & Charles S. Lanier eds.,  2014).  
29 Robert Johnson et al., Death Row Confinement and the Meaning of Last Words, 3 LS. 
141, 147 (2014); see JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 147. 
30 ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS 
156 (2d ed., 1998); see also Mona Lynch, The Disposal of Inmate #85271: Notes on a 
Routine Execution, 20 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 3 (2000)(describing the mechanized and 
impersonal execution process). 
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These humbled creatures, with very rare exceptions, are more dead than 
alive; they offer no resistance, instead following the execution script in 
every morbid detail. Passive acquiescence from persons once considered 
“the worst of the worst” by the juries that sentenced them to death31 is the 
essential contribution of death row confinement to the killing process, 
destroying the human spirit of the prisoners and, in effect, grooming them 
for the execution chamber. As adumbrated in the profound reflections on 
the guillotine rendered years ago by the noted French philosopher Albert 
Camus, “As a general rule, a man is undone by waiting for capital 
punishment well before he dies. Two deaths are inflicted on him, the first 
being worse than the second[.]”32 
DEATH HOUSE ETIQUETTE: LAST MEALS 
Acquiescence in the death house takes many forms. One is being a good 
guest at one’s own last meal, a ritual that, upon reflection, is at once absurd 
and macabre beyond belief.33 Condemned prisoners are typically offered a 
special last meal, as if they are participants in some sort of twisted 
celebration of their lives, their impending deaths, or both. Few refuse, 
though the meaning of their participation is unclear.34 Most dutifully make 
their special requests, though no one knows how many eat their last meals, 
in whole or in part. The details—what is eaten, and what is left on the 
plate—are not published. Some prisoners, in what may be a spoof of the 
process, order enormous and elaborate meals, as if daring the officials to 
cruelly refuse them. 
                                                                                                                           
31 See generally SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS 
THE DEATH PENALTY (2007). 
32 Albert Camus, Reflection on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 
205 (1969). 
33 Brent Cunningham, Last Meals, LAPHAM’S Q. (2013), 
http://www.laphamsquarterly.org/essays/last-meals.php?page=all. 
34 See generally Linda Ross Meyer, The Meaning of Death: Last Words, Last Meals, in 
WHO DESERVES TO DIE: CONSTRUCTING THE EXECUTABLE SUBJECT 176 (2011). 
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Clearly, providing last meals is meant to soften the hard edges of the 
execution process. “It’s the least we can do,” one can imagine the officials 
thinking. And who can blame them? The striking thing, though, is that the 
prisoners, with what amounts to a loaded gun to their heads, go along with 
the routine, ordering and perhaps also eating these meals, and then, as seen 
in ethnographic research, sometimes saying “thank you” to their would-be 
hosts in the death house or even in the execution chamber.35 At best, this is 
a deeply ironic form of passing along their compliments to the staff—
kitchen or custodial, if you will—but it is more likely sheer, unadulterated, 
servile submissiveness. And who can blame them? Officials watch the 
prisoners eat their last meals, maybe take notes; the officers on the 
execution team need to know the mood of the person before them, the 
living, breathing human being they will kill not long after dinner. Some 
prisoners offer their keepers a portion of their final bounty. Sometimes 
officers accept. Killer and victim breaking bread, then arguably breaking 
the most fundamental rule of the social contract: “Thou shalt not kill.”36 
The last meal is a strange and sordid business. Even though the last meal 
is offered with humane pretensions and even though it affords the prisoner 
an opportunity to choose among a range of foods and, by that choice, 
exercise a morsel of autonomy, these are not its purposes. The last meal is 
not food offered as a means of connection but food offered as a way to 
simulate concern and perhaps to disarm the offender, in effect serving as a 
distraction from the killing to come. Murderers don’t feed their victims; 
executions are not cold-blooded killings, we say. They’re not at all like 
                                                                                                                           
35  Expressions of gratitude for last meals occur with some regularity. Jerry Givens, 
Former Member, Virginia Department of Corrections Execution Team, Guest Lecture in 
Honors 302.007H, Death Penalty Colloquium, at American University (Apr. 4, 2012). 
Last words may include expressions of gratitude to staff for their civility or 
professionalism. Scott Vollum & Dennis Longmire. Giving Voice to the Dead: Last 
Statements of the Condemned, 12 CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE REVIEW 5, 11 (2009). 
Informal farewells to staff may express gratitude as well. DONALD A. CABANA, DEATH 
AT MIDNIGHT: THE CONFESSIONS OF AN EXECUTIONER 15–16 (1996)  
36 See JOHNSON, supra note 30, at Part III. 
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murder, and to prove this, we point to last meals as part of a decent ritual, 
not just a break in the violence.37 But one has to imagine, in the spirit of 
Camus, that the person dies a little with each bite of this final meal. We, 
the observers—officials, sometimes researchers—-perhaps die along with 
them. This observation is captured in a first-hand description of a last 
meal, rendered in the form of a poem: 
A fried steak, diced into little squares, 
arrives at the death house, 
neatly reassembled, like a puzzle, 
laid to rest in the center berth 
of a standard white styrofoam box, 
bordered on one side by soggy, sagging fries, 
on the other by wilted greens, curled and brown, 
long past their salad days, like the man himself, 
who ordered this meal as the sad celebration, 
culmination, of a dreary, wasted life 
that it is even now slipping away, 
as he ages before our eyes right there in his cell, 
called “the last night cell” in some prisons, 
“the death cell” in this one. 
- 
Later, he will be cooked, in a manner of speaking, 
in the electric chair, but not diced or reassembled, 
before he is boxed without frills in a plywood coffin, 
the mortuary’s answer to the styrofoam box, and 
buried in the prison cemetery, home to the 
most common and indigestible waste 
of the prison system. 
- 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
37 Daniel LaChance, Last Words, Last Meals, and Last Stands: Agency and 
Individuality in the Modern Execution Process, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 710 (2007); 
Meyer, supra note 34. 
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He eats alone with a plastic fork— 
no knives for the condemned, 
no dinner companions for the condemned— 
chewing carefully, kneeling by his bed, as if in 
genuflection before the raw power of the state, 
his meager meal placed carefully on the steel gray metal bed, 
sitting precariously on the top sheet, drawn tight 
like a sail battened down for heavy weather. 
- 
We look at each other tentatively, almost furtively, 
lawyers, chaplains, even officers speaking in low tones, 
words directed toward the ground, 
as if we are greasy, dirty, our mouths dry, 
tongues swollen, sticking to our teeth, 
- 
our noses stinging from the scent of corruption, 
the bittersweet stink of fear in the air, 
in our hair, on our skin, in our clothes. 
We are guests at a living wake, 
where the dead live, 
where the dead see, 
look you in the eye and see nothing, 
see no one will save them 
see they are utterly alone. 
- 
The condemned man finishes his meal, 
says ‘thank you’ to the officers who fed him dinner, 
and later walks with them to his execution, on schedule, 
dead before the stroke of midnight. We go home, 
stomachs empty, hungry for sleep.38   
Hunger for sleep should be read as hunger to forget—a dreamless sleep of 
denial of what one has seen and, and by virtue of that seeing, become 
                                                                                                                           
38 ROBERT JOHNSON, A ZOO NEAR YOU: POETRY, 148–49 (BleakHouse Publishing 1st 
ed. 2010). 
Reflections on the Death Penalty 595 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014 
complicit. Here we might remember Shakespeare’s haunting admonition in 
Hamlet (III.i.1758): “To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there’s the rub[.]”39 
DEATH HOUSE ETIQUETTE: LAST WORDS 
Many condemned prisoners, we know from studies of last words, go to 
their deaths mute, saying nothing at all, or speaking incoherently; these 
responses, or the lack thereof, can be plausibly linked directly to the 
dehumanizing effects of extended death row confinement.40 Others have 
much to say, offering what might be termed a “farewell speech” in which 
they 
wish others well, offer an apology to all concerned parties, then 
hope to go gladly on their journey (even if this is an unusual 
journey), expecting to find a better life (mostly featuring the 
afterlife), and for all of this they are grateful and, they hope, 
reconciled with the world.41 
For these more voluble prisoners, one line of analysis suggests that their 
last words, like those of their mute or incoherent fellow prisoners, are 
likely a manifestation of the pervasive passivity wrought by the execution 
process. Rooted in the defeatist dynamics of the death row experience, 
their last words portray an often 
contrite acceptance of the traditional social meanings associated 
with the execution, expressed in last words that reflect, not the 
violence of wild, often psychopathic men, but the tame, civil 
sentiments of religion, culpability, remorse, the desire for 
forgiveness, and even gratitude that they have been treated 
decently by others, notably officers and relatives.42 
                                                                                                                           
39 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, 
sc. 1, line 1758 (B. A. Mowat & P. Werstine ed., 1992). 
40 See Johnson, et. al., supra note 29, at 147. 
41 Id. at 146–47; see also Vollum & Longmire, supra note35. 
42 See Johnson, et. al., supra note 29, at 148. 
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Thus it is that the implacable, unyielding force of execution, extending 
from death row through the death house, brings in its wake the abasement 
of condemned prisoners, their last moments soiled by a degradation of self 
that is rendered in their own words. “Kill me,” some say, with their silence; 
“I am not one of you,” say others with their disjointed perorations; “I 
deserve to die,” others intone, with solemn pronouncements of remorse or 
regret; “I thank you for any small kindness you deign to show,” say many, 
in meek word or timorous deed, after their last meal and again after the last 
strap is cinched down, holding them tight to the lethal gurney. Dead, each 
of them, in the manner of Camus’s reckoning, “undone by waiting for 
capital punishment well before he dies.”43 
Then there are words of staff, whispered, we know from ethnographic 
research, in the shadow of the death chamber—during last meals, last 
hours, last walks—offering faux support, seeking collusion with the 
condemned.44 Poet Joanna Heaney captures this dynamic during the last 
walk with a perfect eye for tone and detail in her award-winning poem, 
“Too Little, Too Late.” 
The most gently I can remember being treated 
Was when I was walked to the electric chair 
Two people on either side of me, each holding an elbow; 
If I was older, it would look like they were helping me cross the 
street. 
“You can do this, 
No problem, 
You can do this.”45 
The point of the poem, of course, is that the gentle ministrations of the 
officials in the death house during the prisoner’s last walk are “too little, 
too late.” Where were these helpful people when help might have 
                                                                                                                           
43 Camus, supra note 32, at 205. 
44 JOHNSON, supra note 30, at Part III. 
45 Joanna Heaney, Too Little Too Late, 6 BLEAKHOUSE REV. 15 (2013). 
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mattered? When, in Heaney’s words, the condemned prisoner “was trying 
to live and not to die.” Occurring at the end of a brutal regime of 
confinement on death row, ostensibly humane gestures, however well 
intended, stink of rank hypocrisy. Inevitably, personal intentions 
notwithstanding, every person in the death house colludes in the execution 
process, helping move things along to their grim conclusion. Even the 
chaplain, ostensibly outside the process, paves the way for the execution at 
hand, in effect, blessing the event.46 
ODIOUS COURTESIES 
The words we hear in the death house have a disembodied character, 
floating above the execution process; they are, at bottom, immaterial and 
inconsequential elements of the killing routine. The same is true for 
gestures, like the touching of a hand or elbow or the wiping of a brow. 
“You can do this; I know you can”; and by implication, “I’m here for you.” 
None of this is true. The condemned must do this, and no one is there for 
them. Nothing that is said or done by others in the death house matters in 
any material way; nothing changes the inexorable killing routine. 
Words and gestures of ersatz humanity are but a gloss over the workings 
of a modern-day charnel house. And they remind us—if we need 
reminding—that the justice system relies on what noted existentialist Franz 
Kafka’s aptly termed “odious courtesies”47 to make condemned prisoners 
complicit in their own executions, thereby hiding the underlying violence 
at work. This seductive collusion, so antithetical to human dignity, may be 
among the most glaring violations of human rights that come in the wake 
of executions. We hide this shameful deceit behind form and protocol, 
aided by surface gestures of humanity. Seeming civilities—a supportive 
                                                                                                                           
46 CARROLL PICKETT, WITHIN THESE WALLS: MEMOIRS OF A DEATH HOUSE 
CHAPLAIN 59 (2002). 
47 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 156 (B. Mitchell trans., 1999). (The term “odious” is 
sometimes translated as “repulsive”). 
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arm during the last walk, words of encouragement, attention to the 
prisoners’ last words—are invoked to move the condemned along to their 
deaths in an orderly, unremarkable, seemingly voluntary procession, 
allowing the rest of us to live with executions, and with ourselves. 
